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Abstract 
Corporate governance is about putting in place the structure, processes and mechanism that ensure that the firm 
is being directed and managed in a way that enhances long term share holder value through accountability of 
managers and enhancing organizational performance. Corporate governance refers to a set of rules and 
incentives by which the management of a company is directed and controlled. Hence good corporate governance 
maximizes the profitability and long term value of the firm for shareholders. There is a great awareness among 
the researchers to carry out the researches in “corporate governance’. Very little researches on “corporate 
governance” are available in Sri Lanka and need to be empowered companies to pay a special attention on 
corporate governance. In a way, the present study is initiated on “corporate governance and firm performance” 
with the samples of 28 manufacturing companies using the data representing the periods of 2007 – 2011. Board 
structure, board committee, board meeting and board size including executive directors, independent 
non-executive directors, and non executive directors were used as the determinants of corporate governance 
whereas return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) were used as the measures of firm performance. The 
study found that determinants of corporate governance are not correlated to the performance measures of the 
organization. Regression model showed that corporate governance don’t affect companies’ ROE and ROA. 
Further recommendations are also put forwarded in the research. 
Key words: Corporate governance, firm performance, board size, board structure, board committee, board 
meeting. 
 
Introduction  
Corporate governance is concerned with ways in which all parties interested in the well- being of the 
organization attempt to ensure that mangers and other insiders take measures or adopt mechanisms that 
safeguard the interests of the stakeholders. Corporate governance refers to a set of rules and incentives by which 
the management of a company is directed and controlled.  Good corporate governance maximizes the 
profitability and long term value of the firm for the share holders (khumani etal, 1998). La Porata, Lopez, and 
Shleifer (2000) view corporate governance as a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect 
themselves against expropriation by insiders. Corporate governance   is about putting in place the structure, 
processes, and mechanisms that ensure that the firm is being directed and managed in a way that enhances long 
term shareholder value through accountability of managers and enhancing organizational performance. 
Shleifer and Vishnvy (1997) define corporate governance as a way in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Irrespective of the particular definition, the importance 
of corporate governance arises in a firm because of the separation between those who control and these who own 
the residual claims (Epps and Cereola,2008). Corporate governance has been referred to as a collective group of 
people united as one body with power and authority to direct, control and rule an organization (Ruin,2001). The 
Australian standard (2003) defines corporate governance as  the process by which organizations are directed, 
controlled and held to account. This implies that corporate governance encompasses the authority, 
accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised in the process of managing organizations. 
Corporate governance focused upon the principal –agent problems arising from the dispersed ownership in the 
modern corporation (Berle and Means,1932). They viewed corporate governance as a mechanism where a board 
of directors is an essential monitoring device to minimize the problems board about by the principal – agent 
relationships. In this context agents are the managers, principals are the owners and board directors act as the 
monitoring mechanism. The separation of ownership from the management can lead to managers of firms taking 
action that may not maximize shareholders wealth, but could benefit them and not the owners. Therefore a 
monitoring mechanism is required to protect shareholder interests. (Jensen and Meekling,1976). 
But the fundamentals of the stewardship theory are based on the social psychology, which focuses on the 
behaviour of executives. Stewardship theory sees the strong relationship between managers’ interests and 
success of their firm, and therefore the stewards at to proctect and maximizes shareholders wealth. A steward, 
who improves performance successfully, satisfies most stakeholder groups in an organization, when these groups 
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have interests that one well served by increasing organizational wealth (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). 
Hence, monitoring and accountability can be provided by the adoption of corporate governance principles and 
practices. 
A wide variety of definitions of firm performance have been proposed in the literature (Barney, 2002, 
Velnampy,2005, Velnampy & Aloy Niresh,2012, ). The existing literature on corporate governance practices has 
used accounting based performance measures , such as return on equity (ROE), Return on assets (ROA) and 
market –based measures such as Tobin’s Q, , as proxies for firm performance (Abdullah,2004; Bhagat & 
Black,2002; Daily and Dalton,1993; Hermalin and Weisbach,1991; Lam &Lee,2008; yarmack,1996). However, 
in the present study, board structure, board committee, board meeting and board size including executive 
directors, independent non executive directors and non executive directors are used as the determinants of 
corporate governance while return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are used as the measures of firm 
performance. 
The development of corporate governance structures and practices in Sri Lanka dates back to the British 
Colonial rule in the country from 1796 to 1948 as the corporate form of entities as well as share trading was 
introduced in the country during this period. Even most of the corporate entities presently listed on the CSE also 
have roots dating back to British era. Senaratne (2007) finds two categories of such listed companies (1) 
companies that have commenced during the British rule and continued after independence with or without 
foreign owners and (2) companies that have commenced after independence through the amalgamation of 
several entities formed during the British rule. Hence, the development of corporate governance best practices in 
Sri Lanka has been heavily influenced by British models and system, which derive from the Anglo-Saxon 
(Market based) model of corporate governance. 
Corporate governance initiative in Sri Lanka commenced in 1997 with the introduction of a voluntary code of 
best practice in matters relating to the financial aspects of corporate governance. Voluntary codes of best 
practices on corporate governance were issued on 2003(ICAL, 2003), and in 2007 corporate governance 
standards were made mandatory for all listed companies for the financial year commencing on or after 1
st
 April 
2008. This code covered the effectiveness of the board, separation of the position of CEO and the Chairman, 
appointment of chairman, non-executive directors, professional advice, director’s training, directors 
responsibility for the presentation of financial statements, compliance reporting, internal control and committee 
structures for  boards, including audit committee, and remuneration committees and nomination committees 
(Kumudini and Anona, 2010). 
The new Companies act No 7 was enacted in 2007 to keep abreast with prevalent international laws and to 
safeguard the interest of   all stakeholders including directors, major shareholders, minority shareholders and 
creditors. The act introduced greater protection to minority shareholders, directors’ duties, and transparency and 
accountability. Introduction of corporate governance guidelines would be expected to be significantly related to 
firm performance. Even though various studies have been conducted on this area, No any detailed studies in Sri 
Lankan context. In order to fulfill this gap, the present study is initiated to find out that to what extent corporate 
governance influence on firm performance? 
Review of Literature 
Corporate governance tells “ways of bringing the interests of investors and managers into line and ensuring that 
firms are run for the benefit of investors (Mayer, 1997). Corporate governance is concerned with the relationship 
between the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and society’s conception of the scope of corporate 
accountability (Deakin and Hughes, 1997). It has also been defined by Keasey et al. (1997) to include ‘the 
structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of organizations’. From the 
foregoing analysis, they argue that corporate governance is represented by the structures and processes laid down 
by a corporate entity to minimize the extent of agency problems as a result of separation between ownership and 
control.  
One of the most consistent empirical relationships about boards of directors is that board size is negatively 
related to firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Yermack (1996) finds a statistically significant 
negative relationship between board size and firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q with a sample of 452 
large U.S. industrial corporations for the period of 1984-1991. In the same study Yermack also exhibited that 
companies with small boards have more favorable values for financial ratios. Similarly Eisenberg, Sundgren and 
Wells (1998) concluded the negative relationship between firm board size and performance measured by return 
on assets (ROA) for a sample of 879 small private firms in Finland.  
There are various arguments regarding board sizes. Jensen (1993) argues that “Keeping boards  
small can improve their performance. When boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to 
function effectively and easier for CEO to control.”  Similarly Lipton and Lorsch (1992) stated “When a board 
has more than ten members it becomes more difficult for them all to  express their ideas and opinions.” and add 
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that the U.S. corporate boards are overcrowded which  causes shareholders to lose money, employees to lose 
their jobs and the corporation to lose its  competitive market position. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue for 
smaller boards and recommend that board size should be limited to seven or eight members. The disadvantages 
of large boards lean on the  idea that tasks like communication, coordination and decision making is much 
harder and costlier  among large group of people than in smaller groups. 
Jensen (1993) argued that the preference for smaller board size stems from technological and organizational 
change which ultimately leads to cost cutting and downsizing. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argued the 
possibility that larger boards can be less effective than small boards. When boards consist of too many members 
agency problems may increase, as some directors may tag along as free-riders. Lipton and Lorch (1992) 
recommended limiting the number of directors on a board to seven or eight, as numbers beyond that it would be 
difficult for the CEO to control.However, Linck et  al (2008) provides evidence that smaller boards are not 
necessarily  better than larger  boards. 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) found that companies perform better if boards include more outsiders. Similarly, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found that a clearly identifiable announcement of the appointment of an outside 
director led to an increase in shareholder wealth. There have been differences in findings related to the 
dominance of outside directors on performance when different measures of firm performance have been utilized 
in academic research. For instance, studies utilizing Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance (e.g., Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996) and Market Value Added (e.g., Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001) have found that greater 
representation of outside directors has a negative impact on firm performance. Other studies, (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, and Johnson, 1998), found no significant association between board composition and firm performance 
using moderator analyses incorporating firm size, the nature of financial performance indicator and 
operationalization aspects of board composition. 
It is broadly highly praised that good corporate governance augments a firm’s performance (Brickley et al, 1994; 
Brickley and James, 1987; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Chung et al, 2003; Hossain et al, 2000; Lee et al, 1992; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988. Generally effective corporate governance enhances firm 
performance, some studies have reported negative relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2002). Some other studies have not found any relationship 
(Park and Shin, 2003; Prevost et al. 2002; Singh and Davidson, 2003; Young, 2003). Several explanations have 
been given to account for these apparent inconsistencies. Some have argued that the problem lies in the use of 
either publicly available data or survey data as these sources are generally restricted in scope. It has also  been 
pointed out that the nature of performance measures (i.e. restrictive use of accounting based measures such as 
return  on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE),  return on capital employed (ROCE) or restrictive use of 
market based measures (such as  market value of equities) could also contribute to this inconsistency (Gani and 
Jermias, 2006). Furthermore, it has been argued that the “theoretical and empirical literature in corporate 
governance considers the relationship between corporate performance and ownership or structure of boards of 
directors mostly using only two of these variables at a time” (Krivogorsky, 2006). For instance, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and McAvoy et.al. (1983) studied the correlation between board composition and performance 
whiles Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga  (2001) studied 
the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
Adel Bino and Shrouq Tomar. (2012) , in their study, revealed that ownership structure and board composition 
have a strong impact on Bank performance and Banks with intuitional majority ownership have the highest 
performance  and that as manager’s and Board member’s ownership percentages increase the bank becomes 
more efficient. But board size has no effect on bank performance. 
Chugh, Meador and Ashwin Shantha Kumar (….) found that a Governance structure incorporating largest board 
size creates better opportunities and more resources, thus enhancing the financing performance.  Kumudini and 
Anona (2010), examined the relationship between Corporate Governance practices and firm performances.  
Study confirmed the positive relationship between governance practices (separate leadership, board composition 
and firm performance). Further it indicated that firms have implemented corporate governance strategies which 
have resulted in higher profitability and share price performance.  Another study of Sanjai Bhagat and Brain 
Boltan (2008) divulge that governance measures are correlated future stock market performance and poor firm 
performance, profitability of disciplinary management turnover was positively correlated with stock ownership 
of board members and board independence. Velnampy and Pratheepkanth (2012), identified the impact of 
Corporate governance on ROA, ROE. 
Objectives of the Study 
The following objectives are taken for the study. 
1. To identify the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
2. To find out the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. 
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3. To suggest the organization to adopt good governance practices towards the performance. 
Data Collection. 
The secondary data were collected from Annual reports of the companies, books, Journals, Magazines etc. The 
data representing the period of 2007 to 2011 were extracted from the company’s Annual reports for the analysis. 
Sampling 
The official list of companies in the Colombo stock exchange (CSE) contained 287 companies as of 2012 have 
been categorized under 20 different sectors according to the core business activities of the company. Out of 37 
Manufacturing companies 28 companies were selected for the present study. 
Methodology 
For the purpose of empirical analysis, this study uses descriptive analysis, correlation and multiple regression 
analysis as the underling the statistical test. A descriptive analysis of the data is conducted to obtain sample 
characteristics. The multiple regression analysis is performing on the dependent variables, ROE and ROA to test 
the relationship between the independent variables with firm performance. The regression models utilized to test 
the relationship between the determines of corporate governance such as board structure (BS) , board meeting 
(BM), board committee (BC) including executive directors (ED), independent non-executive directors(INED), 
non-executive directors (NED) , and board size (BOSZ), and firm performance such as return on equity (ROE), 
and return on assets (ROA) are as follows. 
ROE = αo + α1Bs + α2Bc + α3Bm + α4Bosz  + є 
ROA = αo + α1Bs + α2Bc + α3Bm + α4Bosz + є 
Conceptual Frame work 
The following conceptual model was formulated through the extensive literature. 
The above model shows the relationship between the determinants of the corporate governance and firm 
performance.  
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are formulated; 
1. Corporate governance and ROE are significantly correlated 
2. Corporate governance and ROA are significantly correlated 
3. Corporate governance impact on ROE 
4. Corporate governance impact on ROA 
Analysis and Interpretation 
Descriptive statistics were carried out to obtain sample characteristics. Output of the descriptive statistics is 
presented in table 01 
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Table 01- Descriptive Analysis 
 
The Descriptive statistics in table 01 for the independent variables indicate that average number of directors on 
the board in the selected companies is about 8 persons. It is consistent with the study by Zubaidah (2009) and 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992).However it has been observed that some companies have directors up to 11 persons.  
Further study revealed that average number of meetings and committee are 8 and 2 respectively.  
 
Correlation analysis was carried out to find out the relationship between determinants of corporate governance 
and the measures of firm performance.  
Table 02- Correlation Matrix for manufacturing companies 
Variables BS BC BM ED INED BOSZ ROE ROA 
BS 1 0.121 
(0.540) 
0.013 
(0.946) 
0.008 
(0.968) 
0.071 
(0.720) 
-0.179 
(0.363) 
0.082 
(0.676) 
-0.099 
(0.616) 
BC  1 -0.342 
(0.075) 
-0.046 
(0.817) 
0.235 
(0.229) 
0.173 
(0.380) 
-0.135 
(0.494) 
0.335 
(0.082) 
BM   1 -0.353 
(0.065) 
0.046 
(0.818) 
-0.274 
(0.158) 
-0.298 
(0.124) 
-0.109 
(0.580) 
ED    1 -0.295 
(0.127) 
0.449* 
(0.017) 
0.025 
(0.898) 
0.013 
(0.947) 
INED     1 0.389* 
(0.041) 
0.152 
(0.441) 
0.064 
(0.746) 
NED      0.739** 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.942) 
0.287 
(0.139) 
BOSZ      1 0.101 
(0.610) 
0.244 
(0.210) 
ROE       1 0.256 
(0.189) 
ROA        1 
BS: Board Structure, BC: Board Committee, BM: Board Meeting, ED: Executive Directors, INED: Independent 
Non-Executive Directors, NED: Non-Executive Directors, BOSZ: Board Size, ROE: Return on Equity, ROA: 
Return on Assets. 
**, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*, Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The results of the correlation analysis in table 02 show that the determinants of corporate governance such as 
board structure, board committee, board meeting, executive directors, independent non-executive directors, 
non-executive directors, board size are not significantly correlated with ROE and ROA as the measures of firm 
performance. It means companies are still not properly practiced corporate governance guidelines. Therefore 
Companies should pay an attention on the role of corporate governance measures. 
The regression analysis was performed to recognize the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. 
The results of the analysis are given in Table 03. 
  
 N Range Minimum Maximu
m 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Board Structure 28 1 1 2 1.43 .504 
Board 
Committee 
28 3 0 3 2.00 .609 
Board Meeting 28 14 0 14 7.86 3.913 
Board Size 28 8 3 11 7.43 2.116 
Return on Equity 28 120.00 -59.78 60.22 4.8990 21.36876 
Return on Assets 28 76.26 -27.26 49.00 11.9205 16.10456 
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Table 03- Regression Analysis 
Model Summary
a&b
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .414
a
 .171 .027 21.07908 
2 .402
b
 .161 .016 15.97851 
a & b Predictors: (Constant), BoardSize, BoardCommittee, BoardStructure, BoardMeeting 
a. Dependent Variable: ReturnonEquity 
b. Dependent Variable: ReturnonAssets 
 
 
The specification of the four variables ie board size, board committee, board structure, and board meeting in the 
model revealed the ability to predict performance. R
2 
Value of 0.171 and 0.161 which are in the models denote 
that 17.1%, and 16.1%  of the observed variability in performance can be explained by the differences in both 
the independent variables namely board size, board committee, board structure, and board meeting. Remaining 
82.9% and 83.9% of the variance in performance is related to other variable which is not explained, because they 
are not depicted in the model. R
2
 values of 17.1% and 16.1% indicate that there may be number of variables 
which can have an impact on performance that need to be studied. Hence this area is indicated as a scope for 
future research. 
 
 
Table 04- Coefficients for predictors of performance 
 
The results of the regression analysis in table 04 show that the coefficient for all four variables such as board 
size, board committee, board structure, and board meeting are not significant. It can be inferred that board 
committee including independent non executive directors and executive director should have an effective and 
complete role in controlling the opportunistic behavior in management and also they should have regular 
meeting to discuss and monitor the activities of the firms. Further t values for all four variables of corporate 
governance are insignificant event at 5% level.  It means that these variables are not contributing to the 
performance measures of ROA and ROE. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
To conclude, listed companies under the Colombo stock exchange (CSE) are practicing corporate governance 
system. The results of the study provide evidence that the corporate governance measures are not significantly 
correlated with ROE and ROA as the performance measures. So that hypotheses one and two are rejected. R
2 
Models 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized  
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
Dependent  
Variables ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA 
(Constant) 
28.259 -13.112 27.916 21.161   1.012 -.620 .322 .542 
Board structure 
5.757 -3.442 8.284 6.279 .136 -.108 .695 -.548 .494 .589 
Board 
committee 
-10.309 8.882 7.205 5.462 -.294 .336 
-1.43
1 
1.626 .166 .118 
Board meeting 
-2.077 .235 1.134 .860 -.380 .057 
-1.83
0 
.273 .080 .787 
Board size 
.720 1.392 2.041 1.547 .071 .183 .353 .900 .727 .378 
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Value of 0.171 and 0.161 which are in the models denote that 17.1%, and 16.1%  of the observed variability in 
performance can be explained by the differences in both the independent variables namely board size, board 
committee, board structure, and board meeting. Further corporate governance measures did not contribute to 
performance measures of ROE and ROA.   
It can be suggested that the directors of the board should concentrate in playing their vital role properly for the 
activities of the companies and also advice the companies to have more independent directors within the 
benchmark for the number of directors. This is supported by Wyatt (1990) and Baysinger and Butler (1985). As 
per the study, average number of committees which companies had is two. It is better to have all relevant 
committees such as remuneration committee, audit committee and nomination committee to look after the 
activities and task of the companies. Some companies had no any meetings. So that the companies should have a 
regulate meeting. Further decisions made at the meetings are also important for the success of the company. 
Companies can concentrate on segregation of duties for their efficient operations. 
An effective board is one that facilitates the effective discharge of the duties imposed by law on the directors and 
adds value in a way that is appropriate to the particular Company’s circumstances. The board should be 
structured in such way that it: 
• has a proper understanding of and competence to deal with the current and emerging issues of the 
business. 
• exercises independent judgement. 
• encourages enhanced performance of the company. 
• can effectively review and challenge the performance of management. 
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